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Defendant/Appellant Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company,
Inc. ("WYCO"), hereby respectfully submits the following arguments
in response to the Brief of Appellee filed in this appeal by
Plaintiff/Appellee Susan White ("White").
ARGUMENT
I.
WYCO has Marshalled the Evidence.
White's first contention is that WYCO has failed to marshall
the evidence.

White's only example of such alleged failure deals

with testimony concerning the production of the Trust Deed Note to
opposing counsel prior to trial. However, the only testimony which
WYCO admits it inadvertently failed to mention was the biased
testimony of White herself concerning the issue.

Although all

appellants are expected to marshall the evidence, an oversight
concerning the testimony of one witness is not grounds for this
Court to simply assume that the trial court's findings of fact are
all correct, pursuant to Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,
1286-87 (Utah 1993). WYCO has made a good faith effort to marshall
the evidence and should not be penalized for an inadvertent
oversight.
II.
WYCO did not fail to Comply with a Court Order
to Produce Documents.
White's next contention is that the trial court properly
refused to allow the Trust Deed Note or testimony concerning it
1

into evidence at the trial, because WYCO failed to comply with a
court order to produce the document prior to trial.

However, as

White admits on page 10 of her Brief, the documents sought, which
were later declared to not exist by Judge Roth, were solely those
"showing

the

transfer

of

any monies

to

the pension plan."

Documentary evidence of the transfer of monies would include such
things as regular checks, cashiers checks, money orders, receipt of
funds by wire transfer, or receipts for cash. A trust deed note is
not a document showing the transfer of monies but evidencing an
obligation.

Thus, Judge Roth's ruling did not apply to the Trust

Deed, Trust Deed Note, or Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure. Judge West
misunderstood the import of Judge Roth's order and improperly
refused to admit the Trust Deed Note or testimony concerning the
underlying obligation at the trial of this matter.

Such abuse of

discretion requires the reversal of the trial court's judgment.
III.
WYCO did Produce a Copy of the Trust Deed Note
Prior to Trial.
White's counsel continues his incessant argument from trial
that the Trust Deed was not produced prior to trial. However, the
evidence of such production is clearly in favor of WYCO.

The

testimony of Douglas Durban© was clear on this issue. In addition,
Mr.

Merrill

would

have

corroborated

Mr. Durbano's

testimony

concerning the practice in their law firm to maintain documents
which had been provided to the other side in a certain section of
2

the file, in which section was found the Trust Deed Note.

White

argues that the trial court refused to allow Mr. Merrill to draw
that conclusion.

However, what the trial court did was not allow

circumstantial evidence concerning the disclosure of the document.
Although Mr. Merrill did testify that he did not personally deliver
or cause to be delivered the Trust Deed Note to opposing counsel,
such testimony does not support any conclusion that the document
was never disclosed.
White next relies on her own testimony that the Trust Deed
Note was not brought to the depositions of the parties.

However,

not only does this testimony not establish that the document was
never disclosed, but it is offset totally by the testimony of David
Durbano, although arguably equally biased.

The final witness who

testified on the subject was Phil Scott who, at the time of his
deposition, was still working for WYC0 and testified

at his

deposition that he had seen the Trust Deed Note in 1988. However,
at the time of trial, Mr. Scott had been terminated as an employee
of WYCO and thus, his testimony that he now "specifically remembers
the Note was not produced that day," should have been highly
suspect and totally incredible to the trial court.

To impune the

testimony of a licensed attorney based upon such biased testimony
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and
should be reversed by this Court.

3

IV.
White has Admitted the Existence of the Trust Deed Note.
White cannot controvert the evidence in the record concerning
her admissions as to the existence of the Trust Deed Note, as
referenced in WYCO's Opening Brief.

Instead, White refers to

comments made by Judge West at the trial.

However, as explained

previously, Judge West really misunderstood Judge Roth's order
concerning what had been requested and what would therefore be
precluded.

It did not include the Trust Deed Note and White7s

clear admissions as to the existence of the Note should preclude
here from arguing that it could not be submitted at trial.
V.
Testimony Concerning the Obligation Underlying
the Trust Deed Should not have been Precluded by
Either the Parole or Best Evidence Rules.
White's next argument centers on the refusal of the trial
court to admit testimony concerning the underlying obligation of
the Trust Deed, based upon the Parole Evidence Rule.

White

continues to miss the mark on this issue. The Parole Evidence Rule
precludes any evidence of the "contents" of a writing other than
the writing itself.

However, the testimony which Judge West

precluded was not concerning the specific contents of the Trust
Deed Note but was concerning the obligation underlying the Trust
Deed.

Even if the evidence could have been precluded to prove the

wording of the Trust Deed Note, it should not have been precluded
to establish the obligation between WYCO and the Plan underlying
4

the Trust Deed. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent the obligation
underlying a Trust Deed from being a verbal agreement as opposed to
a document in writing.

For that reason, Judge West's ruling

concerning the Parole Evidence Rule should be reversed.
White also contends that testimony concerning the obligation
underlying the Trust Deed was properly precluded by the trial court
based upon the Best Evidence Rule, as Rules 1001 through 1008 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence are commonly called.

Again, the

testimony which was proffered was not necessarily to prove the
specific content of a writing, but was submitted to establish the
obligation

underlying

the

Trust

Deed.

White

attempts

to

distinguish the case of Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982),
based upon the fact that it was a paternity action.

However,

although the action was a different one than the one at bar, the
holding in Roods is certainly applicable.

In Roods, the Utah

Supreme Court held that testimony can be submitted to prove a fact
which has an existence independent of any written document. Id. at
642. The loan which WYCO made and the funds which WYCO paid to the
Plan, so that the Plan could pay White her money, are facts which
are independent of the Trust Deed Note itself.

For that reason,

testimony should have been allowed concerning the facts surrounding
the loan which was made.

Thus, neither the Parole Evidence nor

Best Evidence Rules should have precluded testimony concerning the
obligation underlying the Trust Deed, and the trial courts ruling
based upon these Rules should be reversed.
5

VI.
The Statute of Frauds Should not have Precluded
Testimony Concerning the Obligation Underlying
the Trust Deed.
White argues that the Trust Deed Note was intended to claim an
interest in real property and must, therefore, be in writing,
citing U.C.A. §25-5-1•
for such statement.

However, White gives no legal precedence

The document which is intended to create an

interest in real property is obviously the Trust Deed itself, not
the Trust Deed Note. Indeed there is no legal precedence that the
obligation underlying a trust deed must be in writing. Affirmance
by this Court of the trial court's ruling will create such a
precedence, that even if a trust deed is in writing, properly
notarized and recorded, it will have absolutely no validity unless
the

underlying

obligation

is also

in writing.

This

is a

misapplication of the statute of frauds and, for that reason, the
Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue.
In addition, §25-5-8 of the statute of frauds provides for
contracts to be taken out of the operation of the statute, based
upon part performance. In such cases, testimony must be allowed to
establish by clear and unequivocal evidence the existence of a
contract, which would normally be unenforceable based upon the
statute of frauds, but which is then taken out of the operation of
the statute by part performance. Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt,
538 P.2d

1319, 1322

(Utah 1975); Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v.

Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 613-15

(Utah 1975).
6

However, without

allowing testimony on the issue, it is impossible to establish the
existence of an oral agreement which should be excused from
operation of the statute of frauds.

This is precisely what

happened in the case at bar. This Court should find that the trial
court

abused

its discretion

in refusing

to

allow

testimony

concerning the obligation underlying the Trust Deed based upon the
statute of frauds.
VII.
The Trust Deed was a Valid and Enforceable Document
Which Created an Interest in the Real Property in
Favor of WYCO.
White next contends that the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of
Foreclosure did not transfer an interest in the real property to
WYCO, for lack of consideration. No evidence was submitted to the
trial court concerning the alleged invalidity of the Deed in Lieu
of Foreclosure.

The court only found the Deed in Lieu invalid

based upon a finding that the Trust Deed itself was invalid. Thus,
the only issue before this Court is the validity of the Trust Deed
itself. White cites Banaerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983)
in support of her argument that no consideration existed for the
Trust Deed.

However, Banaerter supports reversal of the trial

court's holding as opposed to affirmance.
In Banaerter, the trial court found that a valid Trust Deed
Note was not in existence, in that it had not been signed.
However, in spite of the lack of a written promissory note, the
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding by other evidence
7

submitted that the underlying obligation did exist which supported
the Trust Deed.

Id. at 101-02.

Had Judge West been willing to

consider all the evidence which was presented concerning the
existence of the obligation underlying the subject Trust Deed, a
similar

finding

that the Trust

Deed was

supported

by valid

consideration would have followed. Indeed, pursuant to Bangerter,
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider such
additional evidence.

Based upon the record before this Court, a

debt existed in this case which supports the Trust Deed.

For that

reason, the trial court should be reversed.
White also cites Beehive Security Co. v. Bush, 400 P.2d 506
(Utah 1965) in support of her argument on consideration.
Bush is totally inapplicable to the case at bar.

However,

In Bush, the

extrinsic evidence which the trial court allowed concerning a
promissory note and mortgage established that no consideration ever
flowed from Beehive Security Co. to Mr. Bush, in exchange for a
note and mortgage. In other words, the mortgage was a sham. Based
on such evidence, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the mortgage and underlying promissory note were void.
Id. at 507.

These facts are as opposite to the facts in the case

at bar as could be. In this case, the evidence clearly established
that money flowed from WYCO to the Plan as a loan, for which the
Plan gave WYCO the subject Trust Deed as security.

This is not a

case where the consideration was never received, as in Bush.

8

For

that reason, Bush does not support White's contention concerning
consideration.
To the extent appropriate, both Banaerter and Bush were
effectively overruled by Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723
P.2d 398 (Utah 1986) , which held that any deed is valid with or
without consideration.

Id. at 401. White's contention of lack of

consideration is truly a red herring, intended to distract the
Court's focus from the real issues in this case.
White also attacks the validity of the Trust Deed based upon
the fact that the legal description for 2.68 acres of the land was
not created until three months after the Trust Deed was executed,
suggesting that it was executed sometime later. It is interesting
to note that in her attack on the date the instrument was actually
signed, White failed to present testimony of the notary public who
notarized the document, whose testimony would have no doubt been
the most credible on that issue. The only explanation for this is
that the notary would have testified that the document was signed
on the date it was purported to be signed.

It is clear from the

record that when WYCO loaned the Plan the money which White
received, the Trust Deed was executed at that time and the legal
description was corrected to include the additional 2.68 acres some
three months later when the additional legal description had been
created.

The addition of the newly created legal description,

three months after the execution of the Trust Deed, with full

9

knowledge of all parties to the Trust Deed, was a correction and
not an alteration or forgery.
In addition to the case of Rasmussen v. Olsen. 583 P.2d 50
(Utah 1978), which was dealt with in WYCO's Opening Brief, White
also cites the case of Losee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132 (Utah 1951) in
support of her argument that the addition of the 2.68 acres to the
legal description made the Trust Deed void. As White admits in her
Brief, Losee is not at all similar to the case before this Court.
In Losee, the trial court apparently concluded that a certain
deed "was void for the further reason that it had been altered."
Id. at 135.1

From the opinion of the case, it is difficult to

determine what the alteration was, although the case states that
Mrs. Jones made "certain corrections on one deed."
However, the reading of the case certainly

Id. at 133.

implies that the

correction was made without any knowledge on the part of the
grantee, making her execution of the deed questionable.

However,

like Rasmussen, Losee does not support a similar finding in this
case, since all parties to the subject Trust Deed knew that the
additional legal description would need to be added sometime after
x

White has totally misquoted Losee to make it appear that the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the ruling concerning the altered deed.
White cited the Court as stating: "The court accordingly agrees
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants are the owners of the
property . . . ." Brief of Appellee, p. 23 (emphasis added). The
Court actually stated:
"The court (meaning the trial court)
accordingly decreed that neither the plaintiffs nor defendants are
the owners of the property in question, . . .." Losee, 235 P.2d at
It is hoped that this
135 (parenthesis and emphasis added).
misquote was done unintentionally.
10

execution of the Trust Deed. The Utah Supreme Court in Losee went
on to state that "No question is raised as to that latter ruling."
Id. at 133.

It appears from this comment that not only did the

Court not affirm the trial court7s finding, since that issue was
not raised on appeal, but the language of this sentence implies
that the Court may have found differently had the issue been
appealed. Thus, White can find no comfort in the holding in Losee.
White

also

attacks

the validity

of

the Trust

Deed

continuing to allege that it violated a court order.

by

It is

interesting that White has totally skirted WYCO's argument on this
issue, that the Minute Entry issued by Judge Roth contained nothing
concerning encumbrance, and that by acquiescence in the dismissal
of the other action some six months later, White has waived her
right to this argument. Instead, White has made a wild supposition
that WYCO failed to address the application of Judge Roth's order
because the Trust Deed was executed years later.
absolutely

no

evidence

in the record

that

There is

supports

such a

supposition, and the Court is left to ponder why White felt this
was her best argument on this issue.
VIII.
The Trust Deed did not Violate the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act.
At the conclusion of her Brief, White argues that the Trust
Deed

and

Deed

in Lieu

Fraudulent Transfer Act.

of

Foreclosure

violated

the

Uniform

There is no evidence in the record that
11

the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in any way violated the Act.

The

trial court only found the Deed in Lieu invalid because it was
based upon a Trust Deed, which the court had incorrectly found
invalid.

Thus, the only issue before this Court dealing with the

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is whether the Trust Deed violated
the Act or not.
White first addresses §25-6-5 of the Act and asserts that 6 of
the 11 badges of fraud are found in this particular case.

The

first assertion, based upon subsection (a) , is that the transfer or
obligation was to an insider.

White tries to make this badge fit

the facts, torturing the definition of insider.
attempt fails.

However, her

The debtor under the Trust Deed was the Plan.

Since the creditor, WYCO, is not a director, officer or person in
control of the Plan, WYCO is certainly not an insider under the
statute.

Although David Durbano is affiliated with both the Plan

and WYCO, this does not create an insider as defined

in the

statute.
White next cites subsection

(b) concerning

possession or control after transfer.

retention of

This badge is also not

applicable, since it was the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure which
transferred the property. Since the Trust Deed only encumbered the
property, subsection

(b) is not applicable.

White next cites

subsection (c) concerning disclosure or concealment.

The Plan did

not conceal the encumbrance, nor was it under any duty to disclose
it. In fact, in the absence of any other option to raise the money
12

required by the court order to be paid to White, it should have
been obvious to her that the Plan would have incurred an obligation
to do so.

Thus, this badge of fraud is also not applicable.

White next argues that subsection (d) applies, concerning suit
or threat of suit. Although this is the only badge of fraud which
is somewhat applicable, it should not be used against the Plan
under the circumstances of this case. It was pursuant to the prior
lawsuit against the Plan that it was required to pay to White
$35,000.00 and pledged the subject property to WYCO in exchange for
that amount plus $10,000.00 in attorney's fees. If this badge is
considered by the Court, the weight given it should be minimal.
White argues that subsection (e) applies, that the transfer
was of substantially all of the Plan's assets. In the first place,
the Plan had substantial equity in other property in 1988, at the
time the Trust Deed was entered into. In addition, the subsequent
transfer of the property by Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in 1990,
which at that time was substantially all its assets, is not the
event which could violate the Act. For that reason, subsection (e)
is not applicable. Likewise, subsection (i) concerning insolvency
is also not applicable.

The Plan did have more assets than

liabilities in 1988, even after the encumbrance of the Trust Deed.
Based upon the definition of insolvency in §25-6-3 of the Act, that
the debts are greater than the assets, the Plan was not insolvent
after the obligation was incurred.

13

Thus, with only one possible

badge of fraud involved, the Trust Deed did not violate §25-6-5 of
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
White contends that §25-6-6 of the Act was also violated.
However, contrary to White's allegations, the Trust Deed was
executed prior to her claim. There was ample evidence produced at
trial, although not considered by Judge West, that reasonably
equivalent consideration flowed at the time the Trust Deed was
executed.

In addition, the encumbrance did not involve an insider

and the Plan had equity in other property at the time of execution
of the Trust Deed in 1988.

Therefore, White is not entitled to

have the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure invalidated.
The fact that the documents were finally recorded on May 18, 1990,
in anticipation of a deficiency action, does not change any of the
above.

In addition, David Durbano did not testify that the Plan

had no assets in 1988, as alleged by White, but testified to just
the opposite. Thus, §25-6-6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
was also not violated by the subject Trust Deed.
White further argues that the Trust Deed was for an antecedent
debt, claiming that it was not executed on or before December 22,
1988.

The trial court did not find that the Trust Deed was

executed after that date. Thus, there is no basis upon which White
can argue that it was for an antecedent debt.

Since the Uniform

Fraudulent Transfer Act has not been violated, the trial court
should be reversed on this issue as well.

14

IX.
WYCO has not Misrepresented the Trial Testimony.
Whiter final argument is that WYCO has misrepresented the
testimony which was presented at trial, by failing to advise this
Court that her standing objection concerning certain testimony was
eventually granted by the trial court.

However, it is precisely

the grant of her objection that forms the basis of this Appeal.
The trial court abused its discretion in granting the objection and
refusing to consider the testimony which had been proffered.

By

way of examples, the trial court should have considered the
testimony

establishing consideration for the Trust Deed, the

disclosure of the Trust Deed Note to opposing counsel prior to
trial, White's admission of the existence of the Trust Deed Note,
the validity of the Trust Deed, and the Plan's equity in other
property at the time of execution of the Trust Deed. Thus, White's
request for Rule 11 sanctions is inappropriate and is a further
effort to focus the Court's attention away from the real issues in
this case.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the record before this Court, it is clear that when
White was paid $35,000.00 pursuant to court order, the Plan had no
liquid assets from which to make that payment.

For that reason,

the Plan borrowed the money from WYCO, a totally separate entity,
and executed a Trust Deed in favor of WYCO to secure the loan.
When the Plan fell into default with WYCO, primarily due to White's
15

successful litigation against it, the Plan cured the default by
executing

a Deed

in Lieu of Foreclosure

transferring the subject property.

in favor

of WYCO,

The transfer was not done

improperly or with any intent to defraud White, who had already
received the $35,000.00 borrowed from WYCO.
Based upon all the arguments above, as well as those contained
in WYCO's Opening Brief, together with the record before this
Court, WYCO respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial
court's ruling and grant judgment in favor of WYCO.

In the

alternative, WYCO requests the Court to remand this matter for a
new trial.
DATED this ^

aay 0 f January, 1995.
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
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Walter T. Meri/ill
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant
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